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Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Option Con-
tracts for the Sale of Goods, and Implying Promises to Find Suffi-
cient Consideration: Why and How the North Carolina Supreme
Court Got it Wrong in Fordham v. Eason*
"Oft times members of both the bench and bar are criticized for failing
to distinguish the forest from the trees. In this case, however, the con-
troversy arises from an attempt to separate the trees from the forest."1
I. INTRODUCTION
The North Carolina Supreme Court rarely ventures into cases
involving contract disputes. However, in Fordham v. Eason, the court
granted discretionary review to decide which of two logging compa-
nies had title to certain timber that each company had separately bar-
gained for.2 In its analysis, the court's discussion of consideration was
incomplete. Further, the court erred by refusing to apply the Uniform
Commercial Code to an option contract for the sale of timber. This
article explores the mistakes in the Fordham opinion and examines
why the court will probably have to reevaluate its decision at some
point in the future.
II. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Hurricane Fran hurled into eastern North Carolina around 8 p.m.
on September 5, 1996.3 The category three hurricane brought wind
gusts up to 120 mph and destroyed a large number of trees, power
lines, and coastal homes.4 Taken collectively, the total damages and
costs for North Carolina were estimated at approximately five billion
dollars, more than one billion of which was the result of damaged for-
estry and timber.5
While many suffered from the storm, the timber industry spotted
an opportunity to acquire fallen trees at a discount. Timber companies
* The author would like to thank Professor Richard A. Lord for his insight into
the case, as well as the members of the Campbell Law Review who helped edit this
article.
1. Bohle v. Thompson, 554 A.2d 818, 821 (Md. 1989) (Alpert, J.).
2. Fordham v. Eason, 351 N.C. 151, 521 S.E.2d 701 (1999).
3. Fran Trashed East in September '96 at: www.usatoday.com/weather/wfran.htm.
4. Id.
5. NCDC Research Customer Service Group, Hurricane Fran, at: www.ncdc.noaa.
gov/ol/reports/fran/fran.html.
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made substantial offers to North Carolina property owners in
exchange for the right to enter and clear away fallen trees. Viewed
from the standpoint of the property owners, these companies were
paying for the right to rid the property owners' land of unwanted
timber.
A.V. and Grace Eason owned real property (hereinafter "the Prop-
erty") in Johnston County, North Carolina which was extensively dam-
aged by Hurricane Fran.6 As a result of the damage, several timber
buyers became interested in purchasing the Easons' timber.7
In the summer of 1996, Wendell A. Fordham, the owner of Ford-
ham Timber Company, Inc. (hereinafter "Fordham"), contacted A.V.
Eason and expressed his desire to purchase the Easons' unwanted
fallen timber.8 On November 11, 1996, the parties entered into a writ-
ten agreement entitled "Timber Cutting Contract."9 This agreement
granted Fordham the authority to "enter, cut and remove . . . forest
products [all timber and pulpwood]" from the Easons' entire property
untilJune 1, 1997.10 The agreement specified the "price per unit Ford-
ham was required to pay for each different type of forest product cut
and removed."" In addition, it stated that the Easons were making the
agreement "for and in consideration of the payment made or to be
made by [Fordham]." 12 The agreement was not recorded with the Reg-
ister of Deeds.' 3
The Easons apparently grew impatient with Fordham's lack of pro-
gress in removing the timber. As a result, on February 7, 1997, less
than three months after the Fordham-Eason agreement was formed, the
Easons entered into another agreement for the sale of their timber, this
time with appellant American Woodland Industries, Inc. (hereinafter
"AWI"). 14 This agreement was entitled "Timber Purchase and Sales
Agreement", and provided that the Easons were selling the "trees, tops
or laps" on their property to AWI, and granted AWI until February 7,
1999 to "enter, cut, and harvest and remove said timber."' 5 AWl paid
6. Fordham v. Eason, 131 N.C. App. 226, 226, 505 S.E.2d 895, 896 (1998),
overruled by 351 N.C. 151, 521 S.E.2d 701 (1999).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 226-27, 505 S.E.2d at 896.
11. Id. at 227, 505 S.E.2d at 896.
12. Fordham, 131 N.C. App. at 227, 505 S.E.2d at 896.
13. Id. at 227, 505 S.E.2d at 896-97.
14. Id. at 227, 505 S.E.2d at 897.
15. Id.
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the Easons a down payment of $30,000 on February 7, 1997.16 The
agreement allowed AWI to deduct the cost of any timber removed, in
accordance with the per-unit prices agreed upon, from the $30,000
down payment. 17 AWI agreed to pay the Easons on a per-unit basis
when the $30,000 deposit was depleted. 8 Additionally, the agreement
required the Easons to refund AWI's deposit "if there is any stoppage
of logging operations for any reason, less the amount of the stumpage
cut. '"19 The Easons signed the agreement with AWI on February 10,
1997 in the presence of a notary public, but the agreement was not
signed by an AWI representative.20 However, AWI's name, along with
its corporate address, was listed at the bottom of the agreement.2
At trial, A.V. Eason testified that he entered into the agreement
with AWI because he "didn't get no results" from Fordham.22 At the
time A.V. Eason signed the agreement with AWI, Fordham had not yet
begun to cut or remove any forest products from the Property. 23
Before signing the AWI-Eason agreement, AWI was aware that the
Easons had entered into an agreement with Fordham, and that the
Fordham-Eason agreement had not been recorded at the Register of
Deeds office. 24 After the execution of this new agreement and payment
of the $30,000 deposit, AWI entered the Easons' property and began to
cut timber in February of 1997.25
Upon discovering the existence of the AWI-Eason agreement,
Fordham immediately retained counsel and secured a temporary
restraining order preventing AWI from cutting or removing any timber
from the Easons' property until the matter could be heard by the trial
court. 26 On February 14, 1997, Fordham filed a complaint requesting
that a preliminary injunction be issued to prevent AWl from logging
the Easons' property until a final determination could be reached.
Also in this complaint, Fordham alleged breach of contract by the
Easons, as well as interference with contractual relations and unfair
16. Fordham v. Eason, 351 N.C. 151, 156, 521 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1999).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 156, 521 S.E.2d at 705.
22. Fordham, 131 N.C. App. at 227, 505 S.E.2d at 896.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 227-28, 505 S.E.2d at 896.
2000]
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and deceptive trade practices by AWI.28 On February 17, 1997, the
trial court granted a preliminary injunction barring AWl from "har-
vesting or logging any of the timber located on those lands owned by
Defendants Eason.
2 9
Several days later, Fordham entered the Property and began cut-
ting and removing timber.30 AWL then filed an answer to Fordham's
complaint on March 21, 1997, denying all pertinent allegations and
alleging several counterclaims, including trespass, wrongful timber cut-
ting, interference with contractual relations, unfair and deceptive trade
practices, and abuse of process.3' Fordham responded to AWl's coun-
terclaims on April 29, 1997, also denying all pertinent allegations.32
Meanwhile, Fordham and the Easons voluntarily dismissed their
claims against each other, leaving only a dispute between Fordham
and AWI.33 Fordham and AWI each filed for summary judgment of
the other's claims.34 The motions were heard and the trial court
entered an order granting Fordham's motion for summary judgment
on all of AWI's counterclaims, and further granting AWI's motion for
summary judgment on all of Fordham's claims.35 AWI appealed the
order granting Fordham's motion for summary judgment as to AWl's
counterclaims.36
The case was heard in the North Carolina Court of Appeals on
October 20, 1998. 37 In an opinion by Judge Horton, the court first
noted that AWl's claims of unfair and deceptive trade practices and
interference with contractual relations had been abandoned for failure
to address them in the appellate brief.3"
In regard to the wrongful cutting of timber claim, the court
applied the North Carolina statute that addresses "[d]amages for
unlawful cutting, removal or burning of timber",39 and held that AWl
28. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 152, 521 S.E.2d at 702.
29. Id. See also Fordham, 131 N.C. App. at 228, 505 S.E.2d at 897.
30. Fordham, 131 N.C. App. at 228, 505 S.E.2d at 897.
31. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 152-53, 521 S.E.2d at 702.
32. Id. at 153, 521 S.E.2d at 702.
33. Fordham, 131 N.C. App. at 228, 505 S.E.2d at 897.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 153, 521 S.E.2d at 703.
37. Fordham, 131 N.C. App. at 226, 505 S.E.2d at 895.
38. Id. at 228-29, 505 S.E.2d at 895 (citing Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
of Charlotte, 289 N.C. 620, 631, 224 S.E.2d 580, 588 (1976); In re Appeal from Envtl.
Management Comm., 80 N.C. App. 1, 18, 341 S.E.2d 588, 598, cert. denied, 317 N.C.
334, 346 S.E.2d 129 (1986); State v. Wilson, 289 N.C. 531, 535, 223 S.E.2d 311, 313
(1976)).
39. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.1 (1996).
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could not recover from Fordham because AWI was not the "owner" of
the lands in question.40 Accordingly, the court dismissed the wrongful
cutting of timber claim.4 1 As to the trespass claim, the court stated
that the element requiring possession of the property by the plaintiff in
such an action could not be fulfilled because AWI was not the owner
of the land. Therefore, the court dismissed the trespass claim.42 The
Court of Appeals further reversed the order of the trial court as to the
abuse of process claim, stating that the evidence showed that AWl had
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to Fordham's motives and
actions in regard to the injunction.43
Both Fordham and AWI petitioned for writ of certiorari to the
North Carolina Supreme Court, and on March 3, 1999, the court
allowed discretionary review of AWI's trespass action.44 In an opinion
by Justice Orr, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals, holding that AWI did have sufficient ownership rights to
bring an action for trespass.45 As this article will reveal, the Court of
Appeals was correct in dismissing AWI's trespass claim; however, it did
so for the wrong reasons.
Any person, firm or corporation not being the bona fide owner thereof or
agent of the owner who shall without the consent and permission of the bona
fide owner enter upon the land of another and injure, cut or remove any
valuable wood, timber, shrub or tree therefrom, shall be liable to the owner of
said land for double the value of each wood, timber, shrubs or trees so
injured, cut or removed.
Id.
40. Fordham, 131 N.C. App. at 229, 505 S.E.2d at 895.
41. Id. at 227, 505 S.E.2d at 898 (citing Woodard v. Marshall, 14 N.C. App. 67, 69,
187 S.E.2d 430, 431 (1972) (Here, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff must
show he is the owner of the land from which the timber was cut in order to state a
cause of action for wrongful cutting of timber.)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 229-30, 505 S.E.2d at 898-99 (citing Edwards v. Advo Sys. Inc., 93 N.C.
App. 154, 157, 376 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1989) (stating the elements of abuse of process),
rev'd on other grounds, Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85
(1990); Petrou v. Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 659, 260 S.E.2d 130, 133 (1979) (in which
the court held that the improper use of the process after it has been issued is
determinative in an abuse of process claim); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-487 (1996) (providing
that "no order shall be made pending such action, permitting either party to cut said
timber trees, except by consent until the title to said land or timber trees is finally
determined in the action")).
44. Fordham, 351 N.C. 151, 521 S.E.2d 701.
45. Id. at 159, 521 S.E.2d at 706.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Classification of Timber: Real or Personal Property?
The first issue the Supreme Court addressed was whether to evalu-
ate this cause of action by using a trespass to chattel or trespass to
realty theory.46 Fordham argued that the timber should be classified
as realty, whereas AWl contended the timber should be classified as
goods governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter "UCC"
or "the Code") as adopted in Chapter 25 of the North Carolina General
Statutes.47 The Supreme Court correctly agreed with AWl and classi-
fied the timber as a good, thereby requiring an analysis using the ele-
ments of a trespass to chattel cause of action.48
The law has traditionally treated a timber interest as an interest in
real property. 49 Early twentieth century case law classified timber as
realty. 50 As realty, timber transactions had to comply with the formali-
ties required for a transfer of an interest in land.51 Several cases also
distinguished the classification and treatment of standing timber from
severed timber, holding that standing timber was realty while severed
timber was personalty.5 2
It is well established that timber trees may be sold and conveyed
separately from the land on which they stand.5 3 Thus, when there is a
sale of standing timber where the buyer has retained the right to cut
and remove the timber, the timber is a sale and not a mere license.54
Further, a logging contract results in a present sale of the described
timber, transferring title at the time of the execution of the contract.55
46. Id. at 153-54, 521 S.E.2d at 703.
47. Id. at 154, 521 S.E.2d at 703.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Drake v. Howell, 133 N.C. 162, 165, 45 S.E. 539, 540 (1903); Mizell
v. Burnett, 49 N.C. 249, 252 (1857)).
50. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 154, 521 S.E.2d at 703 (citing Williams v. Parsons, 167
N.C. 529, 531, 83 S.E. 914, 915 (1914); Hawkins v. Goldsboro Lumber Co., 139 N.C.
160, 162, 51 S.E. 852, 853 (1905)).
51. Id. (citing Dulin v. Williams, 239 N.C. 33, 38, 79 S.E.2d 213, 217 (1953);
Winston v. Williams & McKeithan Lumber Co., 227 N.C. 339, 341, 42 S.E.2d 218,
220 (1947); Morton v. Pine Lumber Co., 178 N.C. 163, 167, 100 S.E. 322, 323
(1919)).
52. Id. (citing Austin v. Brown, 191 N.C. 624, 627, 132 S.E. 661, 662 (1926); Frank
Hitch Lumber Co. v. Brown, 160 N.C. 281, 283, 75 S.E. 714, 714-15 (1912)).
53. See 52 Am. Jur. 2d Logs and Timber §§ 9, 13, 51.
54. See 52 Am. Jur. 2d Logs and Timber § 13 (citing Dunham v. Taylor, 317 P.2d
926 (Or. 1957)).
55. Id. (citing Padilus v. Yarbrough, 347 P.2d 620 (Or. 1959)).
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While the common law treated timber interests as interests in
land, the UCC changed the classification of timber when timber is the
subject of a contract for sale.56 The UCC's classification of timber is
the result of a 1972 amendment to the UCC that has been adopted by
North Carolina. 7 Basing its decision on this amendment, the Fordham
court correctly held that the sale of timber is now considered a sale of
goods, regardless of whether removal is by the seller or the buyer. 58
Therefore, "[a] dispute over a trespass to timber where the claim of a
possessory interest arises under a contract for the sale of timber
should be settled using a trespass to chattel analysis."5 9
B. Consideration
As discussed infra, the North Carolina Supreme Court should
have applied the liberal rules of the UCC when analyzing the Fordham-
Eason agreement. However, regardless of whether the common law or
the UCC was applied, the fact that Fordham was not explicitly bound
56. U.C.C. § 2-107(2) (2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-107(2) (1999).
A contract for the sale . . .of timber to be cut is a contract for the sale of
goods within this article whether the subject matter is to be severed by the
buyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the realty at the time of
contracting, and the parties by identification effect a present sale before
severance.
Id. See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-101 (2000), official comment.
The legal consequences are stated as flowing directly from the contract and
the action taken under it without resorting to the idea of when property or
title passed or was to pass as being the determining factor. The purpose is to
avoid making practical issues between practical men turn upon the location
of an intangible something, the passing of which no man can prove by
evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words and actions of
a tangible character.
Id.
57. U.C.C. § 2-107(2); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-107(2). See also 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales
§ 58 (1985). "Before the amendment the Code provided that the sale of standing
timber under an agreement for severance by the buyer did not constitute a sale of
goods but was a contract affecting land." Id. (citing Leonard v. American Walnut Co.,
609 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Barry v. Bank of New Hampshire, 293 A.2d 755
(N.H. 1972), appeal filed, 304 A.2d 879 (N.H. 1973)).
58. Fordham, 351 N.C. 151, 521 S.E.2d 701. But see Haw River v. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d
275, 278 (4th Cir.1998) (where the Fourth Circuit, interpreting North Carolina law,
adhered to the common law classification and treated timber as realty when the
subject of a sale). Though Haw River is not binding in North Carolina, a more
thorough analysis would have addressed the Fourth Circuit's interpretation, noting
that North Carolina has adopted the UCC's classification of timber.
59. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 155, 521 S.E.2d at 704 (citing W. Page Keeton, Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 14, at 85 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing that trespass to
chattel involves personal property or chattel)).
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by the agreement to remove any of the Easons' timber should not have
led the court to conclude that the agreement failed for want of
consideration.
In asserting its trespass to chattels claim, AWl alleged that at the
time Fordham entered the Property and began removing timber, AWl
had present legal rights to the timber.6 ° Specifically, AWl asserted that
the Fordham-Eason agreement was not binding, while asserting that
the AWI-Eason agreement was a valid contract.6 1 Thus, the determina-
tive issue before the court was whether the Fordham-Eason agreement
was a legally binding contract. 62 A finding that the Fordham-Eason
agreement was binding would have required the court to conclude that
Fordham had a superior possessory right to the timber. This contrac-
tual right would free Fordham from any liability to AWl. Furthermore,
the common law principle of "first in time, first in right"63 would
clearly establish that Fordham was vested with better title to the tim-
ber. Alternatively, if the court found the Fordham-Eason agreement
was invalid, and the AWI-Eason agreement was a binding contract,
Fordham would be liable to AWI in trespass.
Ultimately, the court determined that the Fordham-Eason agree-
ment lacked consideration, and that AWl was in possession of the tim-
ber when Fordham began logging the Property.64 The court based its
conclusion, in part, on the premise that the Fordham-Eason agreement
bound Fordham to do nothing at all.65 By contrast, the court ruled
that the $30,000 paid by AWI to the Easons constituted sufficient con-
sideration.66 While correct in stating the Fordham-Eason agreement
did not require Fordham to remove any timber, the court failed to
address the fact that AWl was similarly not obligated to remove any
timber, regardless of the $30,000 deposit paid to the Easons.67 The
court also neglected to address the fact that the down payment made to
the Easons was entirely refundable in the event that AW did not log
the Property.68 The fact that Fordham did not pay any monetary con-
sideration should not have been determinative to the outcome of this
dispute. Further, the court failed to explore the possibility that the law
60. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 152, 521 S.E.2d at 702.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 14-15 (3d ed. 1993).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 158, 521 S.E.2d at 705 (stating the Fordham-Eason agreement "placed no
obligation on Fordham to cut any timber").
66. Id. at 157, 521 S.E.2d at 705.
67. Id. at 156, 521 S.E.2d at 704.
68. Id.
[Vol. 23:49
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has traditionally implied a promise in similar instances in order to pre-
vent the intended agreement from being illusory.69
Before arriving at its conclusion that the Fordham-Eason agree-
ment lacked consideration, the court acknowledged that the Fordham-
Eason agreement required Fordham to pay a per unit price for all tim-
ber removed during the contract period.7 ° Moreover, as pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, the Fordham-Eason agreement specifically pro-
vided that it was made "for and in consideration of the payment made
or to be made by Fordham.''7 ' Holding this agreement was not binding
for lack of consideration was the court's first error in what turned out
to be a poorly reasoned opinion.
1. The Common Law
As a general rule, consideration is required in order for a promise
to be enforceable.72 In North Carolina,
there is a consideration if the promisee, in return for the promise, does
anything legal which he is not bound to do, or refrains from doing
anything which he has a right to do, whether there is any actual loss or
detriment to him or actual benefit to the promisor or not.73
A promise which otherwise appears illusory 74 will be deemed to have
sufficient consideration when the contracting parties are obligated to
act in good faith. 75 Further, when the parties to an agreement are eco-
nomically dependent upon one another, courts have traditionally
implied a promise to satisfy the consideration requirement.76 As one
leading treatise on the law of contracts has stated, "a party must exer-
69. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (the
leading case from which nearly every first year law student learns that, under certain
circumstances, courts will imply a promise in order to satisfy the consideration
requirement).
70. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 158, 521 S.E.2d at 705-06.
71. Fordham, 131 N.C. App. at 227, 505 S.E.2d at 896.
72. See 7 Samuel Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 7:8, at 115 (Richard
A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1992).
73. Helicopter Corp. v. Cutter Realty Co., 263 N.C. 139, 147, 139 S.E.2d 362, 368
(1964) (citing 17 CJ.S. Contracts § 74, at 426.).
74. See 3 Williston, supra note 72, § 7:7, at 88-89 (defining illusory promises).
Where an illusory promise is made, that is, a promise merely in form, but in
actuality not promising anything, it cannot serve as consideration. Even if it
were recognized by law, it would impose no obligation, since the promisor
always has within his power to keep his promise and yet escape performance
of anything detrimental to himself or beneficial to the promisee.
Id.
75. Mezzanotte v. Freeland, 20 N.C. App. 11, 17, 200 S.E.2d 410, 415 (1973).
76. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
2000]
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cise good faith when that party has an unlimited discretionary power
over a term of the contract if necessary to effectuate the parties' intent
and to save a contract from being held to be illusory."77 A proper anal-
ysis of the circumstances should have led the court to imply a promise
that Fordham would use, at the very least, good faith, to remove the
timber bargained for. This implied promise would have provided the
Fordham-Eason agreement with sufficient consideration to form a
binding contract.
North Carolina courts have historically implied similar promises
under like circumstances. In Mezzanotte v. Freeland, the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals held that "[when] a contract confers on one
party a discretionary power affecting the rights of the other, this dis-
cretion must be exercised in a reasonable manner based upon good
faith and fair play."' 78 Mezzanotte further explained that a promise
conditioned upon an event within the promisor's control is not illusory
if the promisor also "impliedly promises to make reasonable effort to
bring the event about or to use good faith and honest judgment in
determining whether or not it in fact has occurred."79 Such an implied
promise is enforceable by the promisee and constitutes a legal detri-
ment to the promisor.80 Therefore, this implied promise furnishes suf-
ficient consideration to support a return promise.8 1 Because the
Fordham-Eason agreement provided Fordham with such discretionary
power to remove the timber,82 Fordham was bound to act in a "reasona-
ble manner", thereby satisfying the consideration requirement. Mezza-
notte was a case of first impression; therefore, the Court of Appeals
cited to several jurisdictions that had correctly decided the issue,
acknowledging that while "there [were] no North Carolina cases specif-
ically in point, courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that a con-
ditional promise may be accompanied by an implied promise of good
faith and reasonable effort, and that it need not be illusory. "83
77. See Farnsworth on Contracts § 7:17, at 370 (1996 Supp.). "Courts have often
supplied a term requiring one party to exercise good faith when that party has been
given a discretionary power over one of the terms of the contract." Id. at 348.
78. Mezzanotte, 20 N.C. App. at 17, 200 S.E.2d at 414.
79. Id. at 17, 200 S.E.2d at 415 (quoting 1 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
§ 149, at 659 (1960)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Fordham, 131 N.C. App. at 226-27, 505 S.E.2d at 896.
83. Id. (citing Jay Dreher Corp. v. Delco Appliance Corp., 93 F.2d 275 (2d Cir.
1937) (in which the court implied a promise that defendant was required to use
honest judgment in a contract granting plaintiff a right to sell defendant's products,
even though defendant reserved the right to reject any order sent in by plaintiff);
[Vol. 23:49
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This "implied promise doctrine" was best explained in the leading
case of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.84 In this case, the court
implied a promise that bound the plaintiff to use reasonable efforts in
procuring sales for the defendant where both parties to the agreement
were completely economically dependent upon one another.8 5 Justice
Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of Appeals, explained the pol-
icy behind Wood:
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the pre-
cise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes
a broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole
writing may be 'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed....
If that is so, there is a contract. 86
This modern view of contract law focuses more On the intent of the
parties than on the technical language of construction. Under this
view of contract law, courts may imply promises to comply with what
is a clear intent by the parties to contract.
Accordingly, Fordham's discretion to enter and remove timber
from the Property had to be exercised in good faith.8 7 Based on the
facts and circumstances of the case, the only way Fordham could have
made any money via the agreement was to actually remove timber from
the Property.88 Absent an implied promise that Fordham would exer-
cise good faith to log the land, this transaction would make absolutely
no economic sense. A proper common law analysis would have led the
court to find that Fordham had a binding contract with the Easons,
and therefore was not liable to AWl in trespass. Regardless, the Ford-
ham court erred when it chose to analyze the Fordham-Eason agree-
ment under the common law.
Commercial Credit Co. v. Insular Motor Corp., 17 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1927) (in which a
contract provided that plaintiff would purchase only obligations which were
"acceptable", the court stated that "acceptable" meant "acceptable within the usual
business meaning of the word as applied to this kind of business dealing"); Richard
Bruce & Co. v. J. Simpson & Co., 243 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (in which a
contract provided that plaintiff could terminate the agreement if, "in its absolute
discretion, shall determine that market conditions.., make it undesirable[,]" the court
implied a promise that plaintiffs discretion was only "a discretion based upon fair
dealing and good faith-a reasonable discretion")).
84. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 105 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1914); McCall Co. v.
Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909)).
87. See Mezzanotte v. Freeland, 20 N.C. App. 11, 200 S.E.2d 410 (1973).
88. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 152, 521 S.E.2d at 702.
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2. The Uniform Commercial Code
While a common law analysis of the Fordham-Eason agreement
should have led the court to find consideration, such an analysis was
inappropriate in the first place. Because the court correctly stated that
the sale of timber is now classified as a "good" under the UCC,8 9 it
should have applied the liberal rules of construction set forth in the
UCC.
A brief reference to the UCC would have provided the court with
the information necessary to reach a correct holding. Proceeding from
the premise that timber is a "good" governed by the UCC,90 the court
merely had to apply UCC section 2-103, which states that "[elvery con-
tract or duty within the [UCC] imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement." 91 When analyzing a contract for the
sale of goods, courts are required to imply that the parties to an agree-
ment act in good faith.92 This implied obligation of good faith trans-
forms an otherwise illusory agreement into a binding contract with
sufficient consideration.93 In short, the court should have held that
the Fordham-Eason agreement, governed by the rules of the UCC, was
a binding contract for the sale of timber based upon this implied obli-
gation. This decision would have given Fordham a possessory right
superior to that of AWL. Therefore, Fordham should not have been held
liable to AWI in trespass.
3. Identical Agreements
The court ultimately found that the Fordham-Eason agreement
was not a binding contract.94 However, even if this decision were cor-
rect, the court did not follow what should have been the next logical
step in this analysis, which would have required a similar finding that
the AWI-Eason agreement also lacked consideration. Neither Fordham
nor AWl were obligated to remove any timber via their agreements.95
Moreover, the $30,000 down payment made by AWl to the Easons was
89. Id. at 154, 521 S.E.2d at 704.
90. U.C.C. § 2-107(2) (2000).
91. U.C.C. § 1-203 (2000).
92. U.C.C. § 1-203, official comment. "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant
means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade." Id. See also 3 Williston, supra note 72, § 7:7. "Under the [UCC],
the seller would be obligated, at a minimum, to use good faith so that his ability to
avoid his undertaking is not solely within his control." Id.
93. See 3 Wiliston, supra note 72, § 7:7.
94. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 157, 521 S.E.2d at 705.
95. Fordham, 131 N.C. App. at 227, 505 S.E.2d at 896.
[Vol. 23:49
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol23/iss1/4
FORDHAM V. EASON
entirely refundable in the event that no logging operations took
place.96 In essence, if AWl had chosen not to log the Property, AWI's
$30,000 would have been refunded, putting AWI in exactly the same
position as Fordham.97 The only logical conclusion is either that both
Fordham and AWl had binding contracts with the Easons, or neither
did. Regardless of whether the contracts were binding, Fordham
should not have been held liable to AWI.
C. Option Contracts Under the UCC
Though settling the consideration issue was probably all that was
required to bring finality to this dispute, the Supreme Court instead
went on to state that an option contract for the sale of timber-a
good-is not governed by the UCC.98 Given the fact that timber is now
treated as a good by the UCC, when it is the subject of a sale, 99 by
holding that an option contract for the sale of timber is not governed
by the UCC, the Fordham court has, in essence, held that an option
contract for the sale of any good is also not governed by the UCC.100
Assuming the court was correct in its conclusion that the Ford-
ham-Eason agreement was, in fact, an option contract, 10 1 the court was
nonetheless incorrect in concluding that option contracts for the sale
of goods are not governed by the Code.10 2 In reaching its conclusion,
the North Carolina Supreme Court relied primarily on Fisher v.
Elmore, a 1986 Fourth Circuit case. 10 3 The Fisher court concluded
that a timber purchase and sales agreement, similar to the one in Ford-
ham, created only an option to purchase timber rather than a contract
for the sale of goods. 10 4 Fisher, interpreting North Carolina law,
decided whether the proper classification for the timber in question
was real or personal property for purposes of testamentary distribu-
tion.10 5 If analyzed as real property, the timber would have passed to
96. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 156, 521 S.E.2d at 704.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 158, 521 S.E.2d at 706.
99. U.C.C. § 2-107(2) (2000).
100. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 158, 521 S.E.2d at 706.
101. Id. at 156, 521 S.E.2d at 704.
102. See id. at 158, 521 S.E.2d at 706.
103. Fisher v. Elmore, 802 F.2d 771, 773 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that the UCC did
not apply to a bare option contract in North Carolina). Fisher, however, did not
recognize the UCC's classification of timber, and instead treated the timber as realty.
Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 772.
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the devisees of the real property of the decedent.1 1 6 If the timber was
considered personal property, it would have been distributed to the
beneficiaries of the personal property under the will.'0 7
After stating that the option to purchase timber did not create a
contract for the sale of goods, Fisher incorrectly held that an option
contract for the sale of timber was not governed by the UCC.' 8 The
Fisher court explained that a contract for sale would be formed only
when the timber was actually removed. 10 9 As a result, the manner in
which the Code classifies timber (as personal property, whether sev-
ered or standing), did not come into play, and the common law classi-
fication of real property determined the outcome." 0 Relying on Fisher
was a poor decision; by doing so, the North Carolina Supreme Court
avoided an analysis of the UCC in a case of first impression.
Fisher justified its conclusion by citing Rose v. Vulcan Materials
Co., a 1973 North Carolina Supreme Court case that was decided
before the UCC was adopted in North Carolina.'11 From Rose, the
Fisher court extracted the principle that an option to buy and a con-
tract for sale are distinguishable.' 12 This principle formed the central
premise upon which Fisher exclusively relied in concluding that
option contracts for the sale of timber are not governed by the UCC.
113
Both Fisher and Fordham erroneously relied on Rose. Rose, a case that
dealt with completely different circumstances from those in Fisher and
Fordham, centered around issues involving contract illegality and the
appropriate damages therefor." 4 In contrast to Fordham, Rose did not
differentiate between a contract for sale and an option contract for pur-
poses of application of the UCC. 1 15 For a reason not relevant or appli-
cable to the facts of either Fisher or Fordham, the Rose court stated:
"Exhibit B was not itself a contract of sale. Instead, it gave plaintiff an
option to buy."'1 16 Fordham adopted this dicta from Rose, holding:
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 773.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973) (a pre-
Code case).
112. Fisher, 802 F.2d at 773; Rose, 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521.
113. Fisher, 802 F.2d at 773.
114. Rose, 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 668, 194 S.E.2d at 538 (citing 1 Samuel Williston, Treatise on the Law of
Contracts § 61B (Walter H. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1957); 1A James Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 157 (1963)). To determine the appropriate damages, the Rose court made
[Vol. 23:49
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"Fordham and the Easons attempted to create an option to purchase
timber. While contracts for the sale of timber are governed by the
[Code] and are treated as goods, an option to purchase timber is not a
contract for the sale of timber." '117 The Fordham court then went on to
explain that "[s]ince the [Code] governs only contracts for the sale of
timber, . . . an option to purchase timber is not governed by the
[Code]. Instead, an option to purchase timber is governed by the com-
mon law."'118 The court concluded by reinstating the trespass to chat-
tels claim against Fordham. 1 9
The Fordham court's treatment of option contracts was incorrect
for several reasons. The Code defines a "contract for sale" as including
"both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future
time.' 2° In addition, the Code broadly states that "Article [2] applies
to transactions in goods", rather than merely sales of goods. 12 ' This
refutes Fordham's reasoning that contracts for the sale of timber are
governed by the Code, while option contracts are not.122 No good
argument can be made that the Fordham-Eason agreement was not a
"transaction in goods" within the meaning of the Code.123 The UCC
also states, in section 2-204(3), that "even though one or more terms
are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the
parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably cer-
tain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."'124 Applying this section
to the facts in this case, it is clear that Fordham and the Easons
this statement in an attempt to explain that, because the plaintiff had an option to buy,
and not a contract for sale, "[elach time plaintiff placed an order with defendant there
was an acceptance of the seller's offer and a contract of sale was formed[,]" therefore,
"[e]ach time defendant refused to fill such order at the contract price a separate breach
occurred." Rose, 282 N.C. at 668, 194 S.E.2d at 538.
117. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 158, 521 S.E.2d at 706.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (2000).
121. U.C.C. § 2-102 (2000); U.C.C. General Comment (1962). "This Act purports
to deal with all phases which may ordinarily arise in the handling of a commercial
transaction, from start to finish." Id.
122. Fordham, 351 N.C. at 158, 521 S.E.2d at 706.
123. U.C.C. § 2-107(2) (2000).
124. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2000).
If parties intend to enter into a binding agreement, this subsection recognizes
that agreement as valid in law, despite missing terms, if there is any
reasonably certain basis for granting a remedy. The test is not certainty as to
what the parties were to do nor as to the exact amount of damages due the
plaintiff. Nor is the fact that one or more terms are left to be agreed upon
enough of itself to defeat an otherwise adequate agreement. Rather,
commercial standards on the point of 'indefiniteness' are intended to be
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intended to make a contract (an option contract is, by its mere defini-
tion, a contract 12 ) for the removal of the timber in question; 12 6 the
Easons wanted the timber removed from their land, and Fordham
wanted the timber for its business. 127 Additionally, no outlandish cir-
cumstances existed which would present difficulty in determining a
reasonable basis from which to grant a remedy in the event of a breach.
Several jurisdictions have correctly decided that option contracts
for the sale of goods are governed by the UCC. In Merritt-Campbell,
Inc. v. RxP Products, Inc., the Fifth Circuit dealt with the issue of
"whether option contracts for the sale of goods are subject to the
UCC[.] '' 12 Interpreting Texas law, Merritt held that the lower court
was incorrect in ruling that the Texas Business and Commercial Code
(i.e., the UCC) did not apply to an option contract for the sale of
goods. 129 Continuing in their analysis, the Merritt court correctly
stated:
Chapter 2 of the UCC applies to all transactions in goods. A contract
for the sale of goods includes 'both a present sale of goods and a con-
tract to sell goods at a future time[;]' . .. [tiherefore, rights of parties
are not effected by whether the transaction is one for a present sale of
goods or a contract relating to the future.' 30
The Merritt court concluded by holding that the UCC clearly applies
to option contracts for the sale of goods. 13 1 The aforementioned Texas
law is identical to the corresponding North Carolina statute. 132
As persuasive authority, Merritt cited In re Air Vermont, Inc. v.
Beech Acceptance Corp., in which the Vermont Bankruptcy Court held
that option contracts for the sale of land and personal property are
subject to the UCC's statute of frauds. 133 Also, Merritt pointed out
applied, this Act making provision elsewhere for missing terms needed for
performance, open price, remedies, and the like.
U.C.C. § 2-204, official comment (Purposes of Changes).
125. See 5 Williston, supra note 72, § 15, at 708. "[I1f consideration is paid for an
offer, the offer again becomes a binding contract. Such contracts are generally called
options." Id.
126. Fordham, 131 N.C. App. at 226, 505 S.E.2d at 896.
127. Id.
128. 164 F.3d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1999).
129. Id. at 962.
130. Id. (citing Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 2-106(a) (West 2000)).
131. Id. (citing W.H. McCrory & Co. v. Contractors Equip. and Supply Co., 691
S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App. 1985) (holding that an option contract to purchase a forklift
must satisfy the statute of frauds)).
132. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 2-106(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 2-106(a) (2000).
133. Merritt, 164 F.3d at 964 (citing 44 B.R. 446, 450 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984)).
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that the UCC has been held to be applicable to an alleged option con-
tract for the sale of an airplane. 134
Similarly, several federal district courts have held that option con-
tracts for the sale of goods are governed by the UCC. In Theus v. Pio-
neer Hi-Bred Int'l, the court held that an option contract which stated
that Company X "may, at its option," require Company Y to purchase
from Company X, was governed by the Code. 135 Noting that this was
unquestionably an option contract for the sale of goods, the Theus
court reasoned that a contract for sale included "both a present sale of
goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time."136 In Honeywell v.
Minolta Camera, the court also held that "[an option to purchase
goods at a future time is a type of contract for sale and is therefore
governed by the [UCC]."'1 37 Further, the Fourth Circuit, in Florida
Power and Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., held that an option
contract for the purchase of equipment and nuclear fuel was governed
by the Code. 138
Based on the foregoing decisions, the error in Fordham becomes
apparent. Since timber is now classified as a good when it is the sub-
ject of a sale, and option contracts for the sale of goods are properly
governed by the UCC, it logically follows that option contracts for the
sale of timber similarly should be governed by the Code.
The Fordham court also failed to apply, by way of analogy, other
provisions of the UCC that address option contracts for the sale of
goods. "Firm Offers", as defined in the UCC, explicitly deal with one
type of option contract. 139 Though the Easons would probably not be
134. Id. (citing McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. CIM Assocs., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 511, 513
(S.D. Fla. 1978)).
135. 738 F. Supp. 1252, 1255 (S.D. Iowa 1990).
136. Id. (relying on U.C.C. § 2-204 (open terms acceptable) and U.C.C. § 2-311
(option contracts)).
137. 1991 WL 841033 (D.NJ.), 5, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 403 (NJ. 1991)
(citing In re Vaillancort, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 748, 770 (Bankr. D. Me. 1970);
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus. Inc., 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 1091, 1103-04
(Pa. Sup. Ct. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 468 A.2d 748 (Pa. Super. Ct.), aff'd, 488
A.2d 581 (Pa. 1985)).
138. 579 F.2d 856 (1978).
139. U.C.C. § 2-205 (2000).
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its
terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable
time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months;
but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be
separately signed by the offeror.
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considered "merchants" within the meaning of the Code,140 the pur-
poses behind the firm offers provision should nevertheless apply to
this situation. By its plain language, the UCC, under the firm offers
provision, governs a type of option contract for the sale of goods. 14 1
Thus, it is reasonable to infer that the Code applies to all option con-
tracts for the sale of goods. No authority exists to support the Fordham
court's ultimate determination that some option contracts are gov-
erned by the Code while others are governed by the common law.
Moreover, the Fordham court apparently failed to realize that yet
another type of option contract for the sale of goods is governed by the
Code. 142 "Agreements pursuant to which a buyer agrees to purchase
what he needs or requires from a seller in exchange for the seller's
promise to supply him are known as requirements contracts." 143 At
common law, requirements contracts were viewed by most courts as
being illusory or lacking in consideration. 144 However, a more mod-
ern view implies a promise by the seller to continue to produce or sell
the goods in good faith,145 or implies that the buyer will maintain its
business in order to take its good faith requirements. 146 As a result,
courts will imply
140. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2000).
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or
skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.
Id.
141. U.C.C. § 2-205.
142. See U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2000).
A term which measured the quantity by the output of the seller or the
requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may
occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to
any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or
otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or
demanded.
Id.
143. 3 Williston, supra note 72, § 7:12, at 187.
144. Id. at 199 (citing Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429
(S.D. Fla. 1975) (where the court stated: "In early cases, requirements contracts were
found invalid for want of the requisite definiteness, or on the grounds of lack of
mutuality.")).
145. Id. at 208-09 (citing Imperial Refining Co. v. Kanotex Refining Co., 29 F.2d
193 (Kan. 1928)).
146. Id. (citing Fashion House, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076 (R.I. 1989))
(this modern approach has been adopted by the UCC).
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[a]n obligation to carry out the [requirements] contract in the way
anticipated, and not for purposes of speculation to the injury of the
other party, recognizing at the same time, however, that either party
might in good faith cease to have any output or requirements.
14 7
While Fordham and the Easons did not have a requirements con-
tract within the meaning of the Code, the purposes governing the UCC
should have come into play in the court's analysis. The possibility that
the buyer in a requirements contract may not have any requirements,
and thus, would not be bound to purchase from the seller, is analo-
gous to an option contract for the sale of timber when the logging com-
pany is not explicitly bound to remove any of the timber. 148 (Such
agreements do not fail, but instead, under the UCC, imply a promise
transforming these option contracts into "requirements contracts" gov-
erned by the Code.)' 49 Because the UCC explicitly governs this type
of option contract, 150 an option to purchase timber should similarly be
governed by the UCC.
IV. CONCLUSION
The UCC is often praised for liberalizing the laws governing trans-
actions in goods. There is no question that a careful reading and appli-
cation of the Code can be tedious. However, the North Carolina
Supreme Court should not have adopted a holding without first
exploring all of the relevant issues. In Fordham v. Eason, the court
conducted a mediocre analysis and ultimately reached the wrong deci-
sion. Perhaps the court's conclusions were due to a bias for the com-
mon law rules governing contracts, or possibly due to an imprecise
understanding of the UCC. Maybe the court hurriedly found what
seemed to be an easy and correct solution. Whatever the reason, Ford-
ham's discussion of consideration was both inadequate and incorrect.
Further, the court's contention that option contracts for the sale
of timber, which is a good, are not governed by the UCC contradicts
the purposes behind the Code as well as nearly every jurisdiction that
has addressed the issue. Fisher was not binding law in North Carolina,
and a more thorough venture into the law of contracts and the UCC
should have taken place. Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of the
Fordham opinion stems from the proposition that appellate courts
147. Id. at 211-14 (citations omitted).
148. See Fordham, 351 N.C. 151, 521 S.E.2d 701.
149. U.C.C. § 2-306(1).
150. Id.
20001
19
Newman: Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Option Contracts fo
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2000
68 CAMPBELL LAw REVIEw [Vol. 23:49
should be especially careful when reviewing new and challenging areas
of the law.
James T. Newman, Jr.
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